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ESSAY
THE DIRECT COSTS FROM NPE DISPUTES
James Bessen† & Michael J. Meurer ††
In the past, “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), popularly known as “pat-
ent trolls”, have helped small inventors profit from their inventions.  Is this
true today or, given the unprecedented levels of NPE litigation, do NPEs
reduce innovation incentives?  Using a survey of defendants and a database
of litigation, this paper estimates the direct costs to defendants arising from
NPE patent assertions.  We estimate that firms accrued $29 billion of direct
costs in 2011.  Although large firms accrued over half of the direct costs,
most of the defendants were small or medium-sized firms.  Moreover, an ex-
amination of publicly listed NPEs indicates that little of the direct costs repre-
sents a transfer to small inventors.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the American patent system has exper-
ienced an explosion of patent litigation initiated by parties called
“Non-practicing Entities” (NPEs).1  The term “non-practicing entity”
identifies parties who own and sometimes assert patents but do not
practice the technology covered by their patents.2  Commentators
agree that there has been an explosion of NPE patent litigation and
that NPE lawsuits differ in important ways from other patent lawsuits,3
but they disagree in their normative assessments of this phenome-
non.4  We believe that this explosion is troubling, and herein we pre-
sent evidence that NPE litigation imposes substantial direct costs on
high-tech innovators with little apparent offsetting benefit to inven-
tors or innovators5 from assertion of NPE patents.
1 James Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of
Patent Trolls, REGULATION, Winter 2011–12, at 26, 26, available at http://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf; Litigations over Time,
PATENTFREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ (last updated
Aug. 6, 2013).
2 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 26. The “troll” label is applied to NPEs that behave R
opportunistically or cause social harm. Id. But see Highland Plastics, Inc. v. Sorensen Re-
search & Dev. Trust, CV 11-02246 SJO, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.iplawalert.com/uploads/file/Highland%20Plastics%20v%20Sorensen%20
Rsrch.pdf (denying motion to strike “patent troll” from the complaint because it “is a term
commonly used and understood in patent litigation and is not so pejorative as to make its
use improper”).  Colleen Chien coined the term “Patent Assertion Entities” (PAEs) to spe-
cifically identify NPEs who assert patents rather than play some other intermediary role in
the market for patent rights or the market for technology.  Colleen Chien, Assistant Profes-
sor, Santa Clara Univ., Presentation to the FTC/DOJ Hearing on Patent Assertion Entities:
Patent Assertion Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2187314.
3 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?
The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–20 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Allison et al., Extreme Value]; John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 686–89 (2011) [herein-
after Allison et al., Repeat Patent Litigants]; Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 29. R
4 Compare Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 31 (finding that NPE lawsuits caused half a R
trillion dollars in lost wealth from 1990 through October 2010 and that this loss of wealth
has reduced incentives to innovate), with Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing
the Forest for the Trolls, 114 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 4), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2269087 (arguing that practicing-entity patent lawsuits are
often a greater policy concern than NPE patent lawsuits).
5 We use the term “inventor” to refer to the creator of a new technical idea that may
be eligible for patent protection.  We use the term “innovator” to refer to a party who
develops technical ideas into new technology with commercial value.
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In this Essay, we present results from a unique survey of firms
targeted by NPE patent assertions.6  We augment the survey results
with information derived from a comprehensive database of NPE liti-
gation and information derived from publicly traded NPEs’ financial
disclosures.  We find that: (1) the estimated direct, accrued costs of
NPE patent assertions totaled $29 billion in 2011; (2) much of this
burden falls on small and medium-sized companies; (3) publicly
traded NPEs likely cost small and medium-sized firms more money
than these NPEs transfer to inventors; and (4) the distribution of costs
imposed by NPEs is highly skewed, probably because NPEs pursue a
range of different business strategies.
The survey we will describe is unique in three ways.  First, it in-
cludes defendant companies that are privately held, including small
firms.  Second, it reveals information about costs associated with cases
in which NPE patents are asserted but that are resolved before a law-
suit is filed.  Finally, it provides aggregated information about NPE
patent license fees.  These kinds of information have not been availa-
ble in part because the terms of patent licenses are often secret,7 and
in part because previous surveys have simply not asked about asser-
tions that did not advance to the filing of lawsuits.  The costs disclosed
by this survey are significant and should play a prominent role in pol-
icy debates about the treatment of NPE patent lawsuits.
Our survey results are largely consistent with the only other study
of NPE-litigation costs, a study we completed recently with coauthor
Jennifer Ford.8  In contrast to the $29 billion annual-cost figure esti-
mated in this Essay, we previously estimated the annual cost of NPE
litigation to publicly traded American firms to be about $80 billion.9
The previous analysis used a slightly different data set, a very different
empirical approach, and a different concept of “cost.”  Rather than
surveying defendants and asking them to report costs, we observed the
stock market reaction to the filing of an NPE lawsuit against a defen-
dant firm.10  We estimated litigation cost by analyzing stock-price
movements associated with lawsuit filings.11
We are not surprised that the survey generated lower costs than
the stock market event study because the survey measures only direct
6 The survey was conducted by RPX, a firm that helps companies manage risk from
exposure to patent litigation.  The Coalition for Patent Fairness paid RPX to defray part of
the expense of conducting this survey.
7 See Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 257, 257 (2007) (noting that even if a patent or “ones like it have been licensed
dozens of times before, the terms of those licenses, including the price itself, will almost
invariably be confidential”).
8 Bessen et al., supra note 1. R
9 Id. at 31.
10 See id. at 28–31.
11 See id. at 28–29.
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costs from NPE patent assertions while the earlier study measured to-
tal costs.12  Direct costs include the cost of outside legal services, li-
censing fees, and other costs incurred in response to NPE-litigation
risk.  Indirect costs captured by our event-study methodology include
the opportunity costs of the effort exerted by legal, managerial, engi-
neering, and scientific personnel inside the firm, and other business
disruption costs such as loss of goodwill, loss of market share, and
disruption of innovative activities.
This new study also complements our earlier study by providing
information on companies that are not publicly listed, including small
companies.  This information helps reveal the extent to which NPEs
help small and medium-sized firms realize profits from their innova-
tions and the extent to which small and medium-sized firms, to the
contrary, incur costs as the targets of NPEs.
NPEs are individuals and firms who own patents but do not di-
rectly use their patented technology to produce goods or services, in-
stead asserting their patents against companies that do produce goods
and services.13  In the past, some NPEs have played a valuable role in
bringing innovations from small inventors to market.14  Some inven-
tors lack the resources and expertise needed to successfully license
their technologies or, if necessary, to enforce their patents.15  NPEs
provide a way for these inventors to earn rents that they might not
otherwise realize, thus providing them with greater incentives to inno-
vate.16  But in the past, also, some NPEs have used patents opportunis-
tically.  For example, during the late nineteenth century, “patent
sharks” were widely seen as extracting money from innocent individ-
ual farmers and railroad companies.17
However, while NPEs have been around for a long time, over the
last few years, NPE litigation has reached a wholly unprecedented
12 See id.
13 Id. at 28.
14 See James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006); Sannu
K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers?  An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115–16 (2010).
15 McDonough, supra note 14, at 210 (“Individual inventors and small entities rarely R
have the financial resources to commence and sustain a lawsuit. . . .  [The] relatively high
cost has the effect of inhibiting the abilities of individual inventors and small entities to
enforce their patents against large corporations.”).
16 See Ashish Arora, Patents, Licensing, and Market Structure in the Chemical Industry, 26
RES. POL’Y 391, 395–97 (1997). See generally Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff,
Inventors, Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centu-
ries, in LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS, AND COUNTRIES 19, 31–40 (Naomi R.
Lamroeaux, Daniel M.G. Raff & Peter Temin eds., 1999) (discussing the relationships be-
tween inventors and the firms to which inventors assigned their patent rights).
17 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innova-
tion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1829, 1833 (2007).
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scale and scope.18  In 2011, 2150 unique companies were forced to
mount 5842 defenses in lawsuits initiated by NPEs.19  Moreover, the
number of defenses has been growing rapidly, as seen in Figure 1.
Part of this growth has been fueled by new sources of funding and
new business models.20












Large-scale NPE patent litigation is a recent development, so the
empirical literature is limited, but it is growing rapidly.  Our NPE-law-
suit event study is the most closely related piece of earlier research; in
it we found that the annual wealth lost from NPE lawsuits was about
18 See Litigations over Time, PATENTFREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-
npes/litigations/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2013); NPE Impact, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/
index.cfm?pageid=45 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
19 These figures come from the RPX database described below.  About 4% of these
defenses were mounted as declaratory actions rather than infringement suits; these were
nevertheless initiated by the NPEs.  The figure for 2011 reflects, to some extent, an effort
by NPEs to initiate litigation before the America Invents Act took effect and restricted
multiparty lawsuits.  Nevertheless, the trend shown in Figure 1 illustrates rapid growth
before 2011.
20 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 5–6
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report
.pdf; Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggre-
gators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 51–52 (2013).
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$80 billion for publicly traded U.S. firms.21  In theory, this cost could
be composed mostly of transfers in the form of royalty payments to
NPEs.  Indeed, a number of papers argue that NPEs play a socially
valuable role by enabling small inventors to realize greater profits
from their inventions.22  These papers, however, do not provide em-
pirical evidence to support that assertion.
Our 2011 paper rejected that possibility based on the evidence
available to us; we concluded that much of the cost borne by technol-
ogy companies as they defend against NPE lawsuits is a social loss and
not a mere transfer.23  The survey results we describe below provide
strong additional support for our view that much of the cost imposed
on defendants is a social loss.  In particular, the current study finds
that NPEs impose costs not only on large technology companies but
also on many small and medium-sized firms, making it even less likely
that innovative start-ups are net beneficiaries of NPE activity.
One other researcher has quantified the costs to defendants from
NPE litigation.  Catherine Tucker examines the effect of a lawsuit by
an NPE (Acacia) against several firms that make medical-imaging
software.24  She compares the impact of the lawsuit on sales of both
medical-imaging and text-based medical software produced by the
targeted firms.25  She also compares the sales by the targeted firms to
the sales of medical-imaging software made by other firms in the in-
dustry who were not targeted with a lawsuit.26  She finds that sales of
medical-imaging software declined by one-third for targeted firms.27
She attributes the sales decline to a “lack of incremental innovation in
21 Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 31. R
22 See generally Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A Practitioner’s Per-
spective, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 13 (2008) (arguing that the negative percep-
tion of patent trolls does not reflect their true nature and that patent reform will stunt
technological innovation); McDonough, supra note 14, at 208–11 (arguing that having the R
resources to provide a credible threat of litigation will maximize the earning potential of
the patent for the small inventor); Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for
Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED.
CIR. B.J. 165, 172–76 (2008) (arguing that certain patent trolls act as market intermediaries
for small inventors and prevent big corporations from bullying these small inventors); Na-
than Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!, HARV. BUS. REV., March 2010, at 40, 47 (argu-
ing that NPEs provide options for monetizing patents that create a more efficient market);
Shrestha, supra note 14, at 126–30 (arguing that an NPE’s capital and resources provide R
negotiating power for small inventors to enable better prices for their inventions).
23 Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 31–32. R
24 Catherine Tucker, Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion (Mar. 26, 2013) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1976593.
25 See id. at 10–16.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 19 (“The magnitudes of the estimates suggests [sic] roughly a drop of
one-third of sales after litigation commenced.”).
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the period when litigation is ongoing,”28 and she conjectures that in-
cremental innovation was deterred by concerns that it would create
additional risks in the ongoing litigation.29
Two other strands of previous research are especially relevant to
this project.  First, earlier work has quantified legal fees associated
with patent litigation.  We collected data about legal fees that were
made public in court decisions concerning fee shifting in patent
cases.30  Also, the American Intellectual Property Law Association
(AIPLA) conducts a biannual survey of its members and includes
questions about fees in patent lawsuits.31  The sources are helpful and
we report some of their findings below, but they do not contain infor-
mation about NPE litigation in particular, and they do not contain
information about assertions that never reach the filing of a lawsuit.
A better-developed strand of literature reports various character-
istics of NPE litigation.32  While not measuring costs, these studies do
shed light on the question of whether the private losses to firms
targeted by NPE patent assertions also tend to be social losses.  The
answer appears to be “yes.”  NPE patent litigation has all the hallmarks
of patent notice failure that distorts the patent system and makes it
impede technological progress.33  In Patent Failure, we show that the
U.S. patent system works well for chemical and pharmaceutical inven-
tions because the system provides clear notice to the world of the
scope and existence of patent-based property rights.34  For most other
28 Id. at 5.
29 Id. at 26.
30 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Private Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 59, 80–81 (2012).
31 See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011
(2011).
32 This includes Allison et al., Repeat Patent Litigants, supra note 3; Colleen V. Chien, R
Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech
Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009) (noting that while NPEs are not responsible for the
majority of high-tech patent suits, NPEs typically sue multiple defendants, thus increasing
their overall impact); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a
Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309
(2013) (noting, among other things, that the majority of litigation towards the end of a
patent’s term is dominated by NPEs); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 457 (2012) (dispelling myths surrounding the ten most litigious NPEs); David L.
Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335
(2012) (explaining why there has been a rise in contingent-fee representation in patent
litigation); and Tucker, supra note 24.  Other studies have looked at the characteristics of R
NPE patents asserted in lawsuits, including Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 3; Timo R
Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology: An Empirical Analysis of
NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519 (2012); and Shrestha, supra note 14. R
33 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 8; BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RE- R
SEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 9 (2013); Bessen et
al., supra note 1, at 34. R
34 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 15–19 (2008).
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inventions, especially software and business methods, notice failure
means that innovative firms are targeted in patent infringement suits
through no fault of their own.35
Notice failure is likely for NPE lawsuits.  Sixty-two percent of the
time, they feature software patents,36 which are notoriously difficult to
interpret.  John R. Allison, Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and Joshua
Walker study patents litigated multiple times and usually asserted by
NPEs; they find that software patents account for 72% of such law-
suits.37  The patents asserted in NPE lawsuits are often subject to
lengthy prosecutions, which delay public access to information about
patent claims.38  Rather than transferring technology and aiding R&D,
it appears that NPEs usually arrive on the scene after the targeted in-




Between February and April 2012, RPX invited about 250 compa-
nies to participate in a survey of their NPE-related costs.  The pool of
invitees included RPX clients and nonclient companies with whom
RPX has relationships.  Most invitees were technology companies, but
certain nontechnology companies with NPE exposure were also in-
vited (for example, retailers with e-commerce exposure).  Participants
provided information to the extent that doing so was consistent with
their obligations to third parties.  The information was aggregated
and rendered anonymous such that individual data was not
disclosed.40
Participants filled out a standardized Excel template that in-
cluded a range of questions about their NPE-related costs.  The in-
structions for the template asked that participants include certain
statistics estimating all of their direct (external spend) NPE-related
costs from 2005 to 2011.  An NPE was defined to include patent asser-
tion entities (PAEs) and other parties using the same definition as the
NPE Lawsuit Database (discussed below).  A list of each participant’s
NPE litigations from that database was provided to ensure alignment
between the survey response and database.  Templates were submitted
35 Id. at 191–203.
36 Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 29. R
37 Allison et al., Extreme Value, supra note 3, at 18. R
38 See id. at 12–16; Love, supra note 32, at 21; Risch, supra note 32, at 490–91. R
39 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 75–80 (2011).
40 Although RPX provided data for this study, RPX did not exercise control over the
substance of our text.
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by e-mail or directly into a secure online data room.  To the extent
possible, an RPX study team reviewed the submission for quality and
completeness.  If needed, the company was asked certain follow-up
questions.  Finally, RPX aggregated the submitted data within a secure
computing environment.  The resulting data set forms the basis of the
data tables provided in this document.
Of the 250 companies invited to participate, 82 provided data on
lawsuits, and of these, 46 also provided data on nonlitigation patent
assertions and related costs.
B. NPE Lawsuit Database
In addition to the survey, we also used a comprehensive database
of NPE litigation developed by RPX.  These NPE-litigation statistics
are based on cases coded “830 Patent” in the PACER database, which
is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.41  In
case counts, RPX excludes misfiles, nonpatent, false marking and
other non-core patent infringement cases.  When a case is transferred,
RPX counts it as one case and allocates it to the venue to which it was
transferred.  When several cases are consolidated into one, RPX
counts it as one case but with multiple defendants.  When a case is
severed, RPX counts it as separate cases.  In defendant counts, RPX
rolls up operating-company subsidiaries into a parent entity (e.g.,
Samsung Group and Samsung Electronics count as one defendant).42
RPX defines NPEs to include patent assertion entities, individual
inventors, universities, and noncompeting entities (operating compa-
nies asserting patents well outside the area in which they make prod-
ucts and compete).  RPX identifies NPEs through a manual review
process.  In this review process, RPX reads patent complaints found in
PACER and checks information in the complaint against its NPE
database.  RPX also checks its database of plaintiff counsel, searches
public filings, and performs web research.  Some of the factors that
they consider when determining whether a company is an NPE (or
more specifically a PAE) include: Is the entity the same as or does it
share a substantial financial link with a known PAE?  Is there any evi-
dence that the company sells a product or offers a service?  Does the
entity webpage prominently mention technology, licensing, and pat-
ents?  Does the entity webpage offer any product or sales?  Does the
complaint indicate whether the entity has a product in market or in
development that is being harmed by infringement?  Are the lawyers
41 This database does not include patent disputes before the International Trade
Commission.
42 Declaratory actions are included in case counts unless otherwise noted.
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involved known to specialize in representing NPEs?  Is this entity
known as an NPE or as an established operating company?43
This definition of NPE is broader than some other definitions.
There is no consensus among researchers on the proper definition of
NPE.44  Schwartz and Kesan have criticized our reliance on a broad
definition because it reaches plaintiffs like universities who are more
meritorious in some sense.45  They argue that because the database
includes lawsuits filed by universities and other supposedly meritori-
ous plaintiffs, it overstates the costs generated by “bad” trolls.46  It is
surely difficult to attempt to distinguish “good” NPEs from “bad”
ones—some people argue that universities sometimes are bad players
who occasionally abuse overly broad patents.47  But the difficulty of
divining the true nature of NPEs does little to distort our conclusions
for two reasons.
First, relatively little of the patent litigation we study comes from
universities—only about 1% of the NPE lawsuits.48  Instead, the law-
suits in the RPX database were overwhelmingly filed by “patent asser-
tion entities.”49  In fact, the RPX database closely matches other
efforts to categorize litigants.  The lawsuit counts are very similar to
those compiled by Patent Freedom.50  Also, Colleen Chien checked
the RPX database against her own categorization of 1000 lawsuits and
found little difference.51  So our definition of NPE is hardly “uncon-
ventional,” as Schwartz and Kesan claim.52  Moreover, changes to our
database, such as excluding universities, are likely to have only a small
impact on our aggregate estimate of direct costs.
Second, although universities perform research that is extremely
valuable to society and although most university licensing is done in a
socially efficient manner, universities create social costs when they en-
43 There are a range of views among scholars and policymakers about the appropriate
definition of NPE, and different analysts are likely to assemble different NPE-litigation
databases.  Based on our experience researching patent litigation, we believe that the RPX
database yields statistics that are consistent with information about NPE patent litigation
from other sources.
44 See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 429–30 (2014) (explaining the disagreement among
researchers on whether individual inventors and universities should be considered NPEs).
45 Id. at 440–42.
46 Id.
47 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 611, 619 (2008) (“The result is a felt sense among a lot of people that universi-
ties are not good actors in the patent system.”).
48 Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:31 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html.
49 Id.
50 See id. (noting that RPX reported 2921 PAE lawsuits while Patent Freedom reported
2923 NPE lawsuits).
51 Id.
52 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 440–41. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN202.txt unknown Seq: 11 10-JAN-14 11:24
2014] THE DIRECT COSTS FROM NPE DISPUTES 397
gage in patent litigation, especially against defendants who have inad-
vertently infringed.  The problem of cost that we identify is not based
on the identities, motives, or other activities of the NPEs but instead
simply on the excessive litigation the NPEs create.  From this perspec-
tive, we are no less sanguine about excessive litigation among practic-
ing companies, a point we highlight in our book, Patent Failure.53  And
so our estimate of $29 billion implies socially wasteful litigation-re-
lated expenditures and reduced innovation incentives even if it in-
cludes university litigation.  We discuss this topic more in Part V.C.
C. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 compares characteristics of the survey sample with RPX’s
database of NPE-lawsuit defenses.  Data for the survey are on the left,
while data for the entire database of NPE-lawsuit defenses are on the
right.  The 82 surveyed companies collectively mounted 1184 defenses
in NPE lawsuits beginning between 2005 and 2011.  Of these, 784, or
66%, ended in adjudication or settlement and did not involve indem-
nification or other factors that cause costs to be atypical.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF SAMPLE
Sample All NPE lawsuits
Mean Mean
Lawsuit Lawsuits/ Revenue Lawsuit Lawsuits/ Revenue
Companies Defenses Company ($million) Companies Defenses Company ($million)
Number 82 1,184 14.4 $12,474.7 9,385 20,565 2.2 $3,243.3
Resolved 784 15,486
Lawsuits
Percent Resolved 66% 75%
Company Size Share Share Share Share
Small/Medium 44% 13% 2.7 $297.1 90% 59% 1.4 $82.6
Large 56% 88% 14.9 $22,005.0 10% 41% 9.0 $16,666.4
Company Industry
Software 37% 26% 6.7 $7,103.1 22% 31% 3.1 $3,654.8
Hardware 63% 74% 11.2 $15,573.7 78% 69% 1.9 $3,087.2
Public company 72% 14%
Notes: For 2005–2011.  The left panel describes the sample used for this study.  The right panel reports
summary statistics from RPX’s database of all NPE lawsuits.  In the sample, all companies reported revenue.
In the RPX database, only 74% of companies have reported revenue; we assume that companies without
reported revenue are small or medium-sized.  The resolved lawsuits have been terminated due to settlement
or adjudication.  The number of resolved suits excludes those that were simple transfers, had zero litigation
costs (e.g., for incorrect defendants), where the company was substantially indemnified, or where the costs
borne by the company do not reflect the total direct costs of litigation for other reasons.  Revenues are for
the most recent year.  Small and medium-sized companies are those with revenues of less than or equal to $1
billion; large companies are those whose revenues exceed this amount.  Companies identified as “software”
include companies whose main product is software, e-commerce, finance, or undefined.  “Hardware”
includes everything else.
Note that a possible truncation bias arises because so many law-
suits were unresolved at the time of the survey.  Because lengthier dis-
53 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 120–46 (noting a patent litigation “explo- R
sion” in recent years and discussing the possible reasons for such litigation (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
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putes tend to be more costly, at least with respect to legal costs, and
because the number of lawsuit filings has risen sharply in recent years,
cost estimates based only on resolved lawsuits might be understated.54
We divided the companies into subcategories based on their reve-
nue in the most recent year reported (small and medium-sized at
under $1 billion or large at over $1 billion) and whether they were in
the broad software industry (including e-commerce and finance) or
instead in a hardware industry (everything else).55  The latter distinc-
tion might be significant because most hardware industries involve
greater sunk capital costs than do software industries or finance, and
for this reason hardware industries may be more at risk of holdup.56
The right panel shows that small and medium-sized firms domi-
nate the universe of NPE-lawsuit defendants.  Small and medium-sized
companies make up 90% of the defendant firms, mounting 59% of
the defenses.  Firms making less than $100 million in revenue account
for 82% of the defendants and 50% of the defenses.57
As the Table shows, our survey sample consists of companies that
are larger, are more likely to be public, and experience relatively
more lawsuits than the average NPE-lawsuit defendant firm.  In the
rows that control for size and industry sector, survey firms appear to
experience about twice as many lawsuits as do companies in the com-
prehensive database.  This is not surprising; however, it raises the pos-
sibility that our sample might be unrepresentative of the broader
population, possibly experiencing costs that are greater or smaller
than those of the universe of all sued companies.  Below, we do some
tests to see whether the survey appears to have unrepresentative
costs.58
54 See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved?  An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237,
243–45, 257–58 (2006).
55 To preserve data confidentiality, statistical analysis was performed by RPX person-
nel working under our direction.
56 Readers should be mindful of the distinction between the industry of the defen-
dant and the technology covered by the patent asserted by the NPE.  In particular, it is
important to recognize that problematic software patents are often asserted against hard-
ware manufacturers.
57 This estimate assumes that firms with unreported revenue have revenues of less
than $100 million.
58 See infra Part III.B.
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III
FINDINGS
A. Mean and Median Costs
Table 2 provides estimates of mean legal costs,59 licensing costs,
and total costs (the sum of these) with standard errors in parentheses.
The last column also shows median total costs.
TABLE 2.  MEAN LITIGATION COSTS PER DEFENSE
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Direct Legal Costs Licensing Costs Total Cost
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All 1.38 (0.26) 0.20 6.53 (1.76) 0.22 7.91 (1.86) 0.56
Company Size
Small/Medium 0.42 (0.12) 0.07 1.33 (0.42) 0.18 1.75 (0.49) 0.32
Large 1.52 (0.30) 0.23 7.27 (2.01) 0.23 8.79 (2.13) 0.65
Industry
Software 1.50 (0.41) 0.17 1.82 (0.45) 0.30 3.32 (0.81) 0.55
Hardware 1.33 (0.33) 0.21 8.14 (2.35) 0.18 9.48 (2.48) 0.59
Addendum on Legal Costs
AIPLA Survey (2011)
Cost Through Discovery 0.49 – 3.60
Cost Through Trial 0.92 – 6.00
Fee-Shift Cases (Bessen and Meurer 2012)
Summary Judgments 0.84
Trial 3.64
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  The total number of cases is 666; subcategory shares are
listed in Table 1.  Fee-shift data have been deflated to 2011 dollars.
Median total costs per litigation defense fall roughly around half
a million dollars, with the figure smaller for small and medium-sized
firms and larger for big ones.  However, mean total costs are much
higher, nearly $8 million for our survey sample.  This difference im-
plies that the distribution of costs is highly skewed, which we explore
below.60  Thus, one must be particularly careful in extending judg-
ments about the costs of litigation based on small samples.  While “typ-
ical” costs might only be a few hundred thousand dollars, mean
59 In the survey, estimated legal costs for a particular case were specified as:
Value of any legal costs related to this matter through December 31, 2011.
Include outside counsel (lead and local), experts, discovery costs, prior art
searching, jury consultants, graphics, other expenses, and other related
costs.  Include any costs that were ultimately recouped or expected to be
recouped by indemnification agreements or other mechanisms.  Exclude
in-house legal costs.
60 See infra Part III.C.
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costs—reflecting the large costs in a small number of very costly law-
suits—are an order of magnitude higher.
Mean total costs are, not surprisingly, significantly greater for
large companies than for small and medium-sized companies.  This
difference is significant at the 1% level.
The first column reports the legal component of costs.  Mean le-
gal costs per defense range from $420,000 for small and medium-sized
companies to $1.52 million for large companies.
Column 2 of Table 2 reports the dollar amounts paid to the plain-
tiff to settle the case (characterized as a licensing cost).61  Column 3
reports the total costs, the sum of legal and settlement costs.  The
mean settlement costs for small and medium-sized companies are
$1.33 million and for large companies are $7.27 million.  Mean total
litigation costs are $1.75 million for small and medium-sized compa-
nies and $8.79 million for large companies.
Legal costs are about a third as large as settlement costs or about
one-quarter of total litigation costs (and slightly larger for small and
medium-sized companies).62  This implies that a substantial part of
the direct costs of NPE litigation is a deadweight loss to society.63
Also note that NPE litigation is relatively more costly to smaller
companies.  In our sample, the large companies’ litigation costs were
five times as high as small and medium-sized companies’ litigation
costs.  But, as demonstrated in Table 1, the mean revenue of large
companies in our sample is nearly seven times the mean revenue of
the small and medium-sized companies.  This means that, roughly
speaking, smaller companies pay more in direct NPE-litigation costs
relative to their size.
Hardware firms have higher costs than software firms.  This dif-
ference is significant at the 5% level.  Since hardware firms generally
have greater sunk costs than software firms, this difference is consis-
tent with the interpretation that hardware firms are more easily sub-
ject to holdup and hence have to pay more to settle litigation.
61 In the survey, estimated settlement costs for a particular case were specified as:
“Value of settlement.  If a running royalty, estimate the present value of royalties.  If there
was an exchange of patents or other non-standard deal structure then estimate expected
present value cost of that deal.”  Settlement costs include damages awards in a small num-
ber of cases.
62 Weighting the ratios in Table 2 to represent the relative weights of small and large
companies in the total database, legal costs are 23% of the total and licensing costs are
77%.
63 The indirect costs of NPE lawsuits, such as those measured by Bessen et al., supra
note 1, at 31–33, and Tucker, supra note 24, at 28–29, are likely to be a more significant R
source of deadweight loss.
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B. Comparison to Other Studies
As noted above, the survey sample was not randomly selected and
hence could be unrepresentative.  In particular, it might be that sur-
vey respondents tended to be firms with higher-than-average litigation
costs.
We can check the representativeness of our sample by comparing
our findings to other empirical evidence.  First, we compare our sur-
vey results to two different measures of patent litigation costs; then we
compare our measures of NPE assertion costs to data on NPE licens-
ing revenue.  AIPLA conducts a biannual survey of its members, who
estimate their typical legal costs through discovery and through trial.64
They report these estimates for three categories of patent lawsuits de-
pending on the amount at issue in the controversy—specifically, there
is a separate category for whether the amount at issue is less than $1
million, between $1 million and $25 million, or greater than $25 mil-
lion.65  The first and third categories provide the ranges shown in the
addendum to Table 2.66  Few patent lawsuits, including NPE lawsuits,
go to trial,67 so the figure for costs through discovery is more compa-
rable to our survey results.  The AIPLA cost estimates are comparable
or even higher than the mean direct legal costs estimates from our
survey.68
This crude comparison can be refined in two ways.  First, we
make an adjustment to the AIPLA figures to account for the fact that
most patent lawsuits terminate before discovery is complete.  We
made this adjustment in previous work69 and derived an estimate of
expected patent-litigation costs from the AIPLA survey responses of
$483,000.70  This figure is about one-third of the mean direct legal
cost in our survey, but notice that it is very close to the median total
64 See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, supra note 31, at 1. R
65 Id. at 35.
66 For the middle range, the estimated costs are $1.6 million through discovery and
$2.8 through trial.
67 See Kesan & Ball, supra note 54, at 259 (“We . . . find that approximately 80% of R
patent cases settle.”).
68 See infra Table 2 (reporting the survey’s finding of $420,000 to $1.52 million in
direct legal costs and AIPLA’s finding of $490,000 to $3.6 million in costs through
discovery).
69 We are grateful to David Schwartz and Jay Kesan for observing that we failed to
make this adjustment in our initial, working-paper version.  We developed the adjustment
used here in Bessen & Meurer, supra note 30, at 82. R
70 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 30, at 82.  We explained: R
The expected legal cost associated with filing a patent lawsuit depends
on the frequency of each of the different ways a lawsuit may be terminated.
Kesan and Ball analyze patent lawsuit termination data available from the
Administrative Office of the Federal Judiciary.  After examining 5,207 law-
suits filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000, they found that most cases terminate
short of trial, summary judgment, or through other substantive court
rulings.
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direct cost of $560,000 reported in Table 2.  This median number in-
cludes settlement payments as well as direct legal costs.  The median di-
rect legal costs are merely $200,000, which is lower than the adjusted
legal-cost figure from the AIPLA survey.  This brings us to an impor-
tant question of interpretation—do AIPLA survey respondents report
means or medians?  We cannot tell from the survey question, but we
suspect that respondents interpret “typical costs” as median costs.
We also compared the survey means to mean legal fees from pat-
ent cases in the years from 1985 to 2004 in which a patent owner was
required to pay the defendant’s legal fees.71  Converted into 2011 dol-
lars, the cost for lawsuits that ended in summary judgments was
$840,000; the cost for those that ended in a trial verdict was $3.64
million.  Making the same adjustment as above to account for early
termination of cases yields an expected mean cost of $409,000.  This
mean is lower than the mean from our survey sample but not surpris-
ingly different given the escalation in patent-litigation costs because of
the growth in electronic discovery in the past decade.
It is possible, of course, that our survey might report representa-
tive legal costs but unrepresentative licensing costs.  This might hap-
pen, for instance, if our survey overrepresented hardware companies,
In particular, 4.6% of lawsuits reached trial, 8.5% of lawsuits termi-
nated with a summary judgment, dismissal with prejudice, or confirmation
of an arbitration decision, and the remaining 86.9% of cases terminated
earlier in the process.
Kesan and Ball constructed . . . two proxies for legal fees in patent
lawsuits: number of days until the suit terminates, and number of docu-
ments filed.  Their data showed that suits that go to trial last about 1.5 times
[as many days] as suits that end with a summary judgment, and suits that
end with a summary judgment last about 1.5 times [as many days] as all
other suits.  Further, their data showed that suits that go to trial generate
about 2.5 times as many documents as suits that end with a summary judg-
ment, and suits that end with a summary judgment generate about 2.5
times as many documents as all other suits.  Assuming that the expected
legal cost in a suit that ends before summary judgment is one-half of the
cost of a suit that reaches summary judgment, then the estimated amount
for the alleged infringer is . . . $483,000.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Schwartz and Kesan offer two interesting conjectures about the differences between
NPE litigation and other patent litigation.  First, “NPE cases are often filed in speedy ve-
nues” and thus are faster and cheaper than the patent suits studied by Kesan and Ball.
Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 437.  And second, because “[c]ompetitor litigation is R
more document intensive and is frequently litigated more heavily by both parties (e.g., due
to the injunction risk),” they believe that NPE litigation must be less expensive than com-
petitor litigation. Id. at 438 n.65.  They conclude that the AIPLA survey costs are likely to
be high compared to NPE litigation costs. Id.  Their conjectures may be correct, but their
conclusion does not necessarily follow.  NPE-litigation costs may be higher on average than
litigation costs in typical patent lawsuits because the stakes tend to be higher and because
holdup problems are especially severe (since defendants are larger than in typical suits and
more suits are concentrated in high-tech industries).
71 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 30, at 80–81, for an explanation of how we com- R
piled these cases and our accompanying table of results.
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which tend to have relatively higher licensing costs.  However, Table 1
suggests that the share of hardware firms in the survey roughly
matches the share in the universe of NPE-lawsuit defendants found in
the database.  Based on our survey, firms with higher licensing costs
tend to have higher legal costs, all else equal.72  This is likely because
firms facing a large payout can typically reduce the payout or the like-
lihood of having to pay damages in trial by mounting a more aggres-
sive (and more expensive) legal defense.73
Our confidence in our licensing-cost results is strengthened by
independent evidence we have developed on the licensing revenue
earned by NPEs.  We obtained licensing revenue from disclosures74 by
the 10 publicly listed firms that were predominantly in the patent-as-
sertion business during the period from 2005 to 2010 (Acacia, Asure,
Interdigital, Mosaid, Network-1, OPTi, Rambus, Tessera, Virnetx, and
Wi-Lan).  We matched these firms to the filed lawsuits listed in Patent
Freedom’s NPE-litigation database.75  These companies filed lawsuits
against 1,450 companies during this period, accounting for about
one-sixth of all PAE lawsuits filed in the Patent Freedom database.
During the period from 2005 through 2010, licensing revenues
totaled nearly $6 billion.  The mean licensing revenue per lawsuit de-
fense comes to $3.8 million in 2010 dollars.  This figure is quite close
to the estimates we obtained from the survey.  Averaging the mean
licensing cost for different firm sizes as given in Table 2, weighted by
the proportion of small or medium-sized and large firms in the total
sample (as done in Table 4), also gives a combined average of $3.8
million.76  The estimate from the publicly listed PAE firms includes
licensing revenues from nonlitigated patent assertions, while the esti-
mate based on Table 2 does not.  But the data from the publicly listed
firms does not account for accruals—much of the licensing revenue
from lawsuits filed in 2010 was collected not in 2010 but later.  This
means that the estimate from publicly listed PAE firms tends to be
relatively understated.  Taking both of these differences into account,
the two estimates are broadly similar.
72 See infra Table 2 (reporting higher licensing costs in addition to higher legal costs
for large firms compared with the lower licensing costs and legal costs for small and me-
dium-sized firms).
73 See generally Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 127, 137 (1988) (analyzing a model in which parties’ probability of victory is a
function of their legal expenditures).
74 We obtained licensing revenues from the firms’ 10-K forms.
75 Patent Freedom is an independent company that collects data on PAEs and pro-
vides advice and risk assessment.  For details on the database and the matching procedure,
see Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 28. R
76 1.33 x 59% + 7.27 x 41% = 3.77.  If instead we use the regression in the Appendix to
predict litigation cost for the entire sample in the RPX database—this should better adjust
for firm size differences—the weighted average cost comes to $3.2 million.
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In summary, when we use data from a very different sample and
use a very different methodology, we obtain results that are quite com-
parable.  The close similarity of these means suggests that sample-se-
lection issues do not substantially bias the survey findings.  It is
possible, of course, that both samples could be biased the same
amount for different reasons, but that seems unlikely.
C. The Distribution of Litigation Costs
Sample means do not capture the distribution of costs.  In fact,
litigation costs are highly heterogeneous.  Figure 2 shows cumulative
distribution plots of total litigation costs for the small and
medium-sized companies and the large companies in our sample.
The smooth curves represent lognormal distribution functions fitted
to the data.
FIGURE 2. CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL DIRECT LITIGATION
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Total Litigation Cost ($ millions)
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Large
Note: Horizontal axis is logarithmically scaled.  Distributions are fit with lognormal cumu-
lative distribution functions.  The distributions are for resolved lawsuits.
As can be seen, the distribution is highly skewed.  The median
total litigation cost for small and medium-sized companies is $318,000
and for large companies is $646,000.  A large fraction of lawsuits cost
less than $200,000.  But a small number of lawsuits cost much, much
more.  For large companies, 5% of the lawsuits cost more than $22
million.
This heterogeneity likely arises in part from variation in NPE tac-
tics.  Schwartz reports that some NPEs pursue nuisance suits in which
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they sue many companies, big and small.77  Plaintiffs using this tactic
are willing to settle for small payments, often no more than the
amount a defendant would spend on legal fees to defend the case.78
As one such plaintiff lawyer put it, “An NPE . . . intuitively understands
that we could go for triples or home runs, but we can also go for
singles and get a good return and work on other things.”79  Alterna-
tively, NPEs may act like big-game hunters, targeting only one or a few
firms but expecting to win at least several million dollars.80  The law-
suit by NTP against BlackBerry-maker RIM is a good example.81
There, “NTP asserted patents of doubtful validity but managed to win
at trial and obtain a settlement of $612.5 million from RIM.”82  The
survey data does not permit us to clearly identify NPE tactics, but it
does suggest that NPE activity is not uniform.
While there are far fewer suits initiated by big-game hunters, they
represent a disproportionate share of the cost.  The distribution of
costs is such that the top 5% of defenses for large companies account
for about two-thirds of the total cost of defense for large companies.
D. Costs from Nonlitigated Patent Assertions
Many NPE patent assertions are settled without a lawsuit being
filed.83  To gather information on nonlitigated assertions, the survey
also asked a series of questions regarding these costs.  Rather than
count assertions, the survey asked respondents to report cumulative
costs.  Most reported costs for the period from 2005 to 2011, but some
did not have data for the entire period.  Moreover, only 46 of the
companies completed this section of the survey.
The costs of nonlitigated assertions include legal fees and settle-
ment costs paid to patent holders.  They also include smaller amounts
spent on NPE-specific patent-buying programs (including RPX ser-
vices), on NPE-specific clearance searches, and on reexaminations of
NPE patents.
77 See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 370 (“The patents are enforced against an entire R
industry, or alternatively against a slew of defendants in a single lawsuit.”).
78 See id. at 370–71 (noting that some demands are as low as $5,000).
79 Id. at 371.
80 See Patrick Anderson, Do NPE’s “Cost” Us $29 B?  Intellectual Ventures Co-Founder Peter
Detkin Sets the Record Straight, GAMETIME IP (June 28, 2012), http://gametimeip.com/2012/
06/28/do-npes-cost-us-29-b-intellectual-ventures-co-founder-peter-detkin-sets-the-record-
straight/ (discussing the settlement amount of $612.5 million obtained by NTP from
RIM).
81 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 49–50 (illustrating the case as an example of R
a several-million-dollar settlement agreement).
82 Anderson, supra note 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
83 See Fischer & Henkel, supra note 32, at 1 (noting that “NPE patent disputes are R
often settled out of court”).
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The means of these components are reported in Table 3 along
with the cumulative litigation costs incurred by these same companies.
For the sample as a whole, nonlitigation NPE-induced costs were
about half of the comparable litigation costs.  For small and medium-
sized companies in particular, however, nonlitigation costs exceeded
litigation costs.84  This might be because smaller firms lack internal
legal resources, making it relatively more expensive for them to pur-
sue litigation.  Also, nonlitigation costs were higher relative to litiga-
tion costs for hardware firms, perhaps again because hardware firms,
being more at risk of holdup, find it less costly to settle sooner.  None-
theless, this difference is not statistically significant.
TABLE 3. NONLITIGATION COSTS PER COMPANY
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
TOTAL
Nonlitigation Comparable
Mean Cost Cost Litigation Cost
Legal Licensing Other Mean Mean
All 0.50 24.59 4.66 29.75 (13.89) 58.38 (19.18)
Company Size
Small/Medium 0.05 7.85 0.23 8.14 (7.68) 7.06 (3.15)
Large 0.77 34.40 7.25 42.43 (21.22) 88.47 (28.95)
Industry
Software 0.38 11.83 4.14 16.35 (9.14) 38.34 (20.74)
Hardware 0.56 30.76 4.91 36.24 (20.03) 68.08 (26.46)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  Results are for a subsample of 46 companies that reported
full litigation and nonlitigation costs.  Figures are totals over 2005–2011 per company, although
not all companies reported all years.
In any case, it is clear that nonlitigated patent assertions are re-
sponsible for much of the direct costs imposed by NPEs on operating
companies.  In this regard, it is likely that our sample underrepresents
these costs because we have only surveyed companies that have been
involved in litigation.  That is, we have not included the potentially
large number of small companies that have only settled NPE patent
assertions and have not gone to court.  Anecdotal evidence from small
companies suggests that there might be very many such firms, and
their costs are missing from our analysis.85
84 See infra Table 3.  Colleen Chien surveyed 223 high-tech start-ups and found that
“the likelihood that a company reported an actual litigation, rather than the threat of one,
increased with revenue.  Lawsuits represented only 31% of demands received by compa-
nies with under $10M in revenue, but 67% of demands received by companies with over
$10M in revenue.”  Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2014) (manuscript at 10 n.57), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/
facpubs/553.
85 See Chien, supra note 84 (manuscript at 2) (finding that 18% of small companies R
settled due to higher litigation costs); Robin Feldman, Patent Demands & Startup Compa-
nies: The View from the Venture Capital Community 35, 38 (Oct. 18, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346338
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IV
AGGREGATE COSTS OF NPE ASSERTIONS
A. Aggregation
What is the aggregate cost of NPE patent assertions, including
both litigated and nonlitigated assertions?  To estimate this, we began
by estimating the mean cost of resolved litigation for small and me-
dium-sized firms and for large firms.  We could have directly used the
data in Table 2, but this might overstate costs because the average
small or medium-sized firm in our survey sample is larger than the
average small or medium-sized firm in the entire database.86  To cor-
rect for this within-category variation, we regressed log cost against log
revenue for the survey sample and, using this, computed the pre-
dicted mean cost over the actual distribution in the database for each
size category.87  In using these means, we assume that the lawsuits in
each category in the database will, on average, accrue costs equal to
these respective mean values.  That is, for lawsuits where a third party
indemnified the defendant, we assume that some party will pay an
amount equal to the mean cost for defendants in that category even if
the defendant firm itself does not necessarily pay this amount.  Also,
we assume that lawsuits that are still underway will eventually accrue
costs equal to these means even if the current out-of-pocket costs are
not yet equal to this accrued cost.
To adjust these figures to account for nonlitigation assertions, for
each category we divided the total nonlitigation cost by the total num-
ber of lawsuits filed, including lawsuits that were still active.  This gave
us a prorated nonlitigation cost per lawsuit filed.  We added this to the
mean litigation cost for each category to give a total cost of NPE asser-
tions per lawsuit filed.88
The second part of this exercise consisted of breaking the cases in
the RPX NPE database into the two size categories.  Where revenue
was reported (about 74% of the database), we allotted the defenses to
small and large cells depending on whether the revenue was smaller
(finding that over 30% of venture funded start-ups received patent demands, and that
“monetizers” initiated most of these demands).
86 See infra Table 1.  In fact, we calculated aggregate costs using the data in Table 2,
including the software and hardware categories.  These estimates came out about 5%–10%
higher than those reported in Table 4.
87 Regressions are reported in the Appendix.  We used a regression that also included
a dummy variable for firms with less than $100 million in revenue in order to capture a
nonlinearity in the relationship between log cost and log revenue.  The predicted mean
cost per litigation was $1.527 million for small and medium-sized firms and $5.641 million
for large firms.  We also ran regressions using hardware and software dummy variables, but
the coefficients on these dummies were not statistically significant.
88 These are $3.17 million for small and medium-sized firms and $7.59 million for
large firms.
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than or larger than $1 billion.89  We conservatively assigned those
companies without reported revenue to the “small” cells.
B. Year-by-Year Accrued Costs
The left portion of Table 4 presents the number of defenses re-
ported in the NPE database by year for each size category.  The right
portion shows the aggregate cost of NPE assertions per year, which we
calculated by multiplying the number of defenses reported on the left
by the prorated total cost of defense per cell (where the cost of de-
fense includes licensing costs).  The final column reports the aggre-
gate cost, summing over both categories for each year.  Aggregate
direct costs of NPE patent assertions grew rapidly from about $7 bil-
lion in 2005 to $29 billion in 2011.90
TABLE 4. AGGREGATE ACCRUED DIRECT COSTS OF NPES BY YEAR
Number of Defenses Aggregate Direct Accrued Costs (millions)
Year Small/Medium Large Small/Medium Large TOTAL
2005 919 482 $2,916 $3,657 $6,574
2006 899 530 $2,853 $4,021 $6,874
2007 1,238 976 $3,929 $7,406 $11,334
2008 1,571 1,004 $4,985 $7,618 $12,603
2009 1,461 1,198 $4,636 $9,090 $13,726
2010 2,588 1,857 $8,213 $14,090 $22,303
2011 3,424 2,418 $10,866 $18,347 $29,213
Size shares 59% 41% 37% 63%
Note: Aggregate costs are calculated by the method described in the text.  Aggregate costs
include legal costs, settlement costs, and other costs for resolved lawsuits, unresolved lawsuits,
and nonlitigated assertions.  These report accrued costs—that is, we include the full projected
cost of currently unresolved lawsuits.
It is important to note that these totals represent accrued costs,
not necessarily the immediate out-of-pocket cost.  That is, we accrue
the projected cost of a lawsuit in the year in which the suit was filed
even though the lawsuit might not be resolved.  This is important be-
cause about half of the lawsuits filed in 2011 were not resolved at the
time of our survey.  The implication is that substantial sums will be
flowing to NPEs over the next several years from lawsuits already filed.
Because the number of NPE lawsuits has been growing so rapidly, the
89 RPX gathered revenue data from the financial statements of publicly listed firms as
well as estimates based on information such as number of employees available for private
firms.  Revenues were not reported when a private firm could not be definitely identified
in their data sources.
90 As a point of comparison, Polinksy and Shavell calculate that “the litigation costs
associated with the U.S. tort system are approximately $46 billion per year.”  A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages 2 (Jan. 24, 2012) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990786.
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current revenues of NPEs likely understate the total costs of lawsuits
already filed.91
Moreover, the effect of these assertions does not just fall on a
small number of large companies.  Some NPE advocates have argued
that NPE litigation is largely a matter of lawsuits against a small num-
ber of large “serial infringers.”92  To the contrary, these data show that
about 59% of the litigation events are directed to small and
medium-sized companies and about 37% of the aggregate cost falls on
small and medium-sized companies.  Moreover, this share is likely un-
derstated because, as discussed above, this analysis does not include
those companies that have only faced NPE assertions that did not go
to court.
Finally, these tabulations do not include the indirect effects of
NPE assertions on defendants’ businesses.  Case-study evidence sug-
gests there are significant indirect costs of NPE patent assertions.93
These include diversion of management or engineering resources, de-
lays in new product introductions and improvements, loss or delay of
revenue, and credit constraints.  Bessen, Ford, and Meurer estimate
the total business costs of NPE litigation for public firms using stock
market event studies.94  Although the samples and methods are not
directly comparable, they find an aggregate loss of stock market capi-
talization of around $80 billion per year during recent years, corre-
sponding to an aggregate cost in operational funds to the firms of
about half that amount.95  This suggests loosely that total business
costs of NPE assertions might be at least twice as large as the figures
reported in Table 4.
C. Benefits to Innovators
It is sometimes argued that NPEs facilitate innovation by provid-
ing incentives to small inventors who would not otherwise be able to
license their patents.96  In this view, “NPEs create patent markets, and
those markets enhance investment in start-up companies by providing
91 We also caution readers not to rely on intuition based on the median cost of de-
fending against NPE patent assertions.  Median cases are “typical,” but of course it would
not be correct to multiply the median cost by the number of assertions to calculate aggre-
gate costs numbers.
92 Patrick Anderson, Did Serial Infringers Commission “Academic” Patent Study to Support
Widespread Infringement?, GAMETIME IP (Sept. 20, 2011), http://gametimeip.com/2011/09/
20/did-serial-infringers-commission-academic-patent-study-to-support-widespread-infringe
ment/.
93 See Tucker, supra note 24, at 26–28. R
94 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 26, 28. R
95 See id. at 26 (finding that the “defendants are mostly technology companies that
invest heavily in R&D”).
96 See McDonough, supra note 14, at 190; Risch, supra note 32, at 459; Shrestha, supra R
note 14, at 115–16. R
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additional liquidity options.  NPEs help businesses crushed by larger
competitors . . . who infringe valid patents with impunity.”97
How much of the costs accrued by defendants actually flow to
inventors?  We can gain some indication of this by looking at the ex-
penditures of publicly listed NPE firms.  Examining the 10-K filings of
these firms, we identified the licensing revenues that these firms re-
ceived as well as the payments these firms made to inventors in the
form of royalties (when the inventor kept title to the patent) and pat-
ent-acquisition payments (when the NPE bought the patent).98  We
also obtained the amount the NPE firm spent on its own R&D, which
some of these firms perform in order to acquire more patents.  Table
5 reports the mean annual payments for those years where we could
identify both licensing revenues and payments to inventors.99
TABLE 5. ANNUAL PAYMENTS FROM DEFENDANTS TO NPES
AND INVENTORS
Annual Expenditures Share of Defendant
($2010 millions) Payments
Payments from Defendants
Licensing Revenues of NPEs $1,161 77%
Implied Defendant Legal Cost $348 23%
TOTAL Defendant Payments $1,510 100%
Payments for Invention
Royalties + Patent Acquisition $59 5%
Small Inventors $32 3%
Large Inventors $27 2%
NPE Own R&D $169 15%
NPE Operating Costs $818 47%
NPE Net Income $115 10%
$1,161
The top panel of the table displays the out-of-pocket payments
made by defendants.  The licensing revenues are the mean settlement
payments that these NPEs received per year, totaling just over $1 bil-
lion in 2010 dollars.  Using the mean ratio of defendant legal costs to
settlement costs from Table 2 (.3 to 1), the second row of Table 5
97 Risch, supra note 32, at 459 (footnote omitted). R
98 See infra Table 5.  In some cases we used patent-acquisition payments from the
Cashflow Statement; in others, we used the amortization of patent assets from the Income
Statement.  The latter includes more than just payments to inventors, such as legal costs
related to patent acquisitions.
99 The data include the following years for each company: Acacia, 2007–11; Asure,
2002–06; Interdigital, 2004–11; Network-1, 2003–11; OPTi, 2002–10; Rambus, 2003–11;
Tessera, 2005–11; Virnetx, 2007–11; and Wi-Lan, 2006–11.  Figures for Tessera only in-
clude the Intellectual Property business unit.
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shows the imputed defendant legal cost, summing to a total annual
cost to defendants of $1.5 billion from this group of NPEs.
The second panel shows the flows to inventors and to NPEs’ R&D
departments.  Payments to independent inventors come to only 5% of
the direct costs to defendants (and are only 7% of NPE licensing reve-
nues).  Note furthermore that this figure likely overstates the long-
term flow of funds to inventors because it compares current licensing
revenues to current patent-acquisition payments, but the patents ac-
quired will likely accrue additional licensing revenues in the future.100
If we include payments to the NPEs’ own R&D departments, then,
loosely, payments to inventors come up to 20% of defendants’ costs.
Finally, 47% of the direct costs to defendants are eaten up by NPE
operating costs, and another 10% are NPE profits.
Based on these figures, it seems difficult to make a convincing
argument that the effect of NPEs is to increase innovation incentives.
First, previous research has shown that the defendants in these law-
suits are largely tech companies that invest heavily in R&D.101  This
estimate suggests that their losses are much larger than the possible
flows to small inventors, especially if one adds indirect costs of NPE
litigation to the direct costs reported in Table 5.  Effectively, what de-
fendants pay in costs as a result of NPE litigation reduces their own
R&D budgets.  Small inventors would have to be an order of magni-
tude more innovative per dollar of R&D than the defendant compa-
nies in order for the net effect on innovative activity to be positive.
Second, to the extent that small inventors are important for inno-
vation, NPE patent assertions hinder innovation by hurting small in-
ventors in at least two ways.  As we have seen, the majority of
defendants in NPE lawsuits are small and medium-sized companies,
and these companies accrue larger costs relative to their size.102  Risch
finds that the median revenue of a company filing an NPE patent in
his sample is $6.3 million.103  Given that the median revenue of a com-
pany in the RPX database of firms sued by NPEs is $10.8 million, it
appears that the typical firm sued by an NPE is roughly the same size
as the typical firm benefiting from NPE activity.  Also, these costs
100 We also include licensing revenues from patents acquired in the past, but patent
acquisitions have been increasing rapidly, so this is a much smaller effect.
101 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 26. R
102 See Chien, supra note 84 (manuscript at 5–6) (illustrating the costs on small compa- R
nies).  “66% to 82% of unique defendants in NPE cases made less than $100M” per year.
Id. (manuscript at 10).  Their small size makes them more vulnerable and less able to
absorb the impacts of demands: 40% of survey respondents reported that their company
delayed hiring or achievement of another milestone, changed the product, pivoted their
strategy, shut down a business line or the entire business, and/or lost valuation due to a
patent demand. See id. (manuscript at 12).  “The smaller the company, the less able it was
to absorb the impact of a lawsuit without a significant impact . . . .” Id. (manuscript at 13).
103 Risch, supra note 32, at 488. R
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make things more difficult for small inventors who wish to license
their technology—not just their patents—to other firms.  If the pro-
spective licensees expect NPE-related costs, they will be less willing to
license from small inventors or will not be willing to pay as much.
Third, the incentives provided to patent holders by the current
crop of NPEs may be the wrong kind of incentives.  NPE activity may
skew the research agenda of small firms away from disruptive technol-
ogies and toward mainstream technology and associated patents that
can be asserted against big incumbents.  Even worse, small firms are
encouraged to divert investment from genuine invention toward sim-
ply obtaining broad and vague patents that might one day lead to a
credible, if weak, lawsuit.104
The publicly listed NPEs are only a part of the population of
NPEs, but they are an important part, accounting for about one-sixth
of all NPE lawsuits.105  It is possible that the private NPE firms might
pay higher royalties to inventors or pay more to acquire patents.  But
there is no evidence of this, nor any evidence to support the common
assertions from patent lawyers that NPEs help small inventors.  The
available evidence suggests instead that NPEs burden small firms.
V
RESPONSE TO CRITICS
An earlier version of this Essay has attracted significant criticism.
The most thoughtful commentary comes from David Schwartz and Jay
Kesan whose work appears in the same issue of the Cornell Law Re-
view.106  In this Part, we address our critics, with special attention given
to Schwartz and Kesan.  For convenience, we have organized the criti-
cal comments into three main questions.
A. Have We Overstated the Direct Costs from NPE Disputes?
Given the explosion of NPE patent litigation, it is difficult to pin
down precisely the direct costs to defendants, but we believe that the
$29 billion annual figure derived above is a plausible estimate; the
true number could be higher or lower.  Before we take issue with the
claims that our estimate is biased upward, we take a moment to review
some findings that do not seem to be disputed.
We have not read anyone who seriously disputes that NPE patent
litigation has exploded.  Something important is happening.  Over a
104 See Chien, supra note 84 (manuscript at 18) (“Among the 90 patentees [listed] on R
the ‘Investor Testimonials,’ ‘Inventor Spotlight,’ and ‘Senior Spotlight,’ sections of [two
NPEs’] websites, based on our analysis, less than 15% appeared to be connected to still
practicing companies not focused on patents.” (footnotes omitted)).
105 Calculation by authors.
106 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44. R
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decade, the amount of NPE litigation has grown from less than 5% of
all U.S. patent litigation to over 60%.107  We have not read anyone
who seriously disputes that NPEs have a bargaining advantage over
practicing-entity patent plaintiffs because NPEs are invulnerable to
patent counterclaims and have lower litigation costs, especially discov-
ery costs.108  We have not read anyone who seriously disputes that
NPE litigation is concentrated in business method, software, and com-
puter technologies, technologies for which many believe the U.S. pat-
ent system performed poorly even before the rise of NPE litigation.109
These observations suggest that NPEs have rushed in to exploit fail-
ings in the patent system by displacing operating-company plaintiffs
because the NPEs can more effectively extract payments from innova-
tors who are targeted as defendants through no fault of their own.
Thus, the case for new patent-policy reform was already made before
this study.
Returning to the costs from NPE disputes, we first observe that
the total costs to defendants may far exceed $29 billion once the indi-
rect costs of NPE disputes are accounted for.  Our event-study re-
search indicated that the annual aggregate cost to defendants from
NPE lawsuits is about $80 billion.110  The survey that we describe in
this Essay did not attempt to quantify the indirect business costs from
NPE patent assertions because the lawyers who received the survey
probably did not have good information on indirect costs.
The event-study methodology captures the reaction of stock mar-
ket investors to the filing of an NPE lawsuit.  Investors care about and
have reason to learn about both direct and indirect costs borne by
defendant firms because these costs are reflected in changes in share
value.111  Schwartz and Kesan criticize the event studies for two rea-
sons.  First, one  professor has “harshly criticized” this methodol-
ogy.112  Second, they tell us that the estimates do not correspond with
107 See Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Strategic Behavior
by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 15 (Univ. of Ill. Coll.
of Law, Ill. Public Law & Legal Theory Papers Series No. 08-21, 2009), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1337166.
108 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 34. R
109 See id. at 29, 34–35; Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation?  An Analysis of the Quan-
tity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5–6 (2013)
(“[O]pportunistic litigation by licensing firms may disproportionally add to increased costs
because the more uncertain scope of software and business methods makes these patents
ideal tools to extract rents from independently inventing producers in ‘hold up’
litigation.”).
110 Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 26. R
111 See id. at 29–31.
112 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 447 & n.12 (discussing Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., On R
the Continuing Misuse of Event Studies: The Example of Bessen and Meurer, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
35 (2008)).  Lunney is skeptical of the efficient market hypothesis that is central to finan-
cial economics. See Lunney, supra, at 53–54.
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their personal experiences as patent attorneys.113  Nevertheless, this
methodology is widely accepted and has been used in over a thousand
research studies.114  And we suspect that our sample of 2,887 events
for publicly listed firms is likely far more representative than the expe-
rience of a few attorneys who are unlikely to have direct knowledge of
investor losses in any case.115  Although the event study needs to be
interpreted carefully, this sort of criticism does little to dispel the indi-
cation that the private costs of NPE disputes might well be higher than
$29 billion.
Critics have identified two different types of biases that might
cause our survey-based measures of direct costs to be overstated: mis-
leading responses by respondents (or manipulation by RPX), and sta-
tistical bias attributable to the survey sample or the survey response
pattern.116  We do not take the first type of criticism seriously.  This
study provides the best-available survey data related to activities that
are usually shrouded in secrecy.  Ideally, the federal government will
take steps to make patent settlement and licensing more transparent
and make more empirical analysis of NPE patent litigation possible.117
We cannot guarantee the honesty of survey respondents, but we as-
sume for the most part they simply copied data from available busi-
ness records for their survey responses.  Why would a respondent be
dishonest when there is so little to be gained from the distortion of a
single survey response?  And RPX has reputational concerns that lead
us to believe that it was in its best interest to help us produce an hon-
est report.118  We have not received any compensation from RPX or
113 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 448. R
114 Our search of scholarly papers in the SSRN archive, http://www.ssrn.com, found
2191 papers using the key words “event study.”
115 Schwartz and Kesan also point out that the event studies are only for publicly listed
firms.  Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 447.  That is correct; including private firms R
would make the aggregate cost even higher.  They also criticize the study for not consider-
ing what happens after the lawsuit is filed.  In fact, the paper does look for evidence of a
bounce back by extending the event-study window, but finds, to the contrary, that losses
deepen.  And the paper discusses the literature that finds that stock market values are not
restored when the lawsuits are settled.
116 See id. at 434–35, 446.
117 See Mark Bohannon, The FTC Roadmap on Patent Litigation Aggressors, OPENSOURCE
.COM (July 1, 2013), http://opensource.com/law/13/7/ftc-patent-litigation-roadmap
(describing possible FTC investigation of the activities of PAEs).
118 The GAO apparently trusted RPX data enough to use it to verify the accuracy of
litigation data from Lex Machina, though the GAO indicated it was “not able to fully assess
the reliability of the judgments RPX used in making [litigant] classifications.” See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS
THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY
5 n.14 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf.
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any other source to carry out this research.119  This project fits nicely
with our long-standing research interests.
Schwartz and Kesan have more plausible concerns about sample
and response bias.  They argue that our sample of firms (RPX clients
or firms that have some relationship with RPX) has higher-than-aver-
age litigation costs and that, among this sample, the firms that are
most likely to respond are the firms with the highest litigation cost.120
Then they observe that if these biases are present, it is not appropriate
to impute the mean costs derived from our survey to the entire popu-
lation of NPE defendants.121
Out of concern about possible biases, Part III.B demonstrates the
plausibility of our results by benchmarking the outside legal costs and
licensing payments measured in this study against patent-litigation
cost measures derived from other data sets using a variety of meth-
ods.122  In particular, we use two different sources of data on patent
litigation costs to confirm that the payments for patent defenses re-
ported in the survey are plausible.  Furthermore, we show that the
license revenue per lawsuit derived by publicly traded NPEs corre-
sponds closely to licensing payments reported in the survey.123  Of
course, critics may question whether publicly traded NPEs differ sys-
tematically from nonpublic NPEs in terms of their license revenue per
lawsuit.  Once again, the lack of transparency concerning patent li-
censes blocks us from further investigating this question.
Why doesn’t the bias suggested by Schwartz and Kesan appear in
our survey data?  They have merely identified possible biases; they have
not established that these are significant.  Indeed, we provide esti-
mates of the costs of litigation from three different sources (survey,
publicly listed NPEs, and stock market event studies) and these are all
more or less consistent once differences in the costs being measured
are taken into account.  It is possible, of course, that all three of these
data sources represent biased samples, but that seems unlikely, and
Schwartz and Kesan would need to come up with some explanation
for why all three would have similar biases.
Moreover, there are a priori reasons to believe that the biases are
not present or even push the data in the opposite direction. To un-
derstand the possible sample bias, one must understand why firms
119 We did receive funding for a summer research assistant from the Computer and
Communications Industry Association, and we have a grant from the Kauffman Founda-
tion that provides us general research support.
120 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 434–35. R
121 Id. at 436.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 64–71. R
123 See supra text accompanying notes 74–76. R
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subscribe to the RPX service.124  If the main effect of RPX member-
ship is a fixed reduction in expected litigation cost per defense, then
high-frequency defendants are more likely to select membership; how-
ever, there would be no relationship between membership and ex-
pected cost per suit and thus no sample bias.  It is even possible that
certain firms who face NPE suits at a high frequency have a relatively
high aggregate, expected NPE-lawsuit defense cost and lower-than-av-
erage defense costs per suit.125  This could happen if experience with
NPE suits makes defendants more efficient—perhaps because they
have previously gathered relevant documents to meet discovery re-
quests, trained personnel to handle depositions, developed litigation
strategies, or the like.126  Schwartz and Kesan’s discussion of response
bias also confounds litigation frequency with cost per defense.  They
speculate that respondent firms likely had “easier access to the infor-
mation.”127  Perhaps this is true (we have no way to know), but this
seems to be an attribute associated with frequency of litigation and
not with magnitude of defense costs.  Finally, they suggest various rea-
sons why large firms are overrepresented in our sample and contend
that this may distort our results.128  We are careful to note that large
firms do indeed face higher costs (and small firms face higher costs
relative to their revenue), but we account for this difference in the
extrapolation that yields our aggregate-cost figure.
In the two years since we first published our event study, no one
has come forward with actual empirical evidence to suggest our esti-
mates are substantially biased.  Certainly, more data and better re-
search could generate lower estimates, but Schwartz and Kesan simply
have no empirical basis for their conclusion that the $29 billion esti-
mate is “substantially overstated.”129
B. Is $29 Billion in Direct Costs Really a Problem?
Yes, a $29 billion tax on innovation is a problem that keeps us up
at night.  Not much of this payment goes to inventors or innovators;
rather, most of the payment is dissipated by transfers to the NPEs’
124 Firms select RPX service if the subscription fee is less than the expected litigation
savings.  RPX seeks to reduce expected litigation costs by acquiring patents, by facilitating
syndicate patent purchases by members, by providing litigation intelligence, and recently
by offering insurance. Reducing Patent Risk, RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-services
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
125 As Schwartz and Kesan suggest, other assumptions are consistent with RPX mem-
bership being positively correlated with high costs per defense.  Schwartz & Kesan, supra
note 44, at 435. R
126 One additional point: because the RPX subscription fee rises with firm size, it is not
clear that only large firms with high litigation exposure select membership.
127 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 435. R
128 Id. at 435–36.
129 Id. at 455.
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owners, investors, and personnel, and to the lawyers representing
both the NPEs and the defendants.130  Most importantly, the direct
costs from NPE disputes are borne by firms because they chose to in-
novate and thereby exposed themselves to the largely unavoidable risk
of an NPE lawsuit.131  Unfortunately, this tax on innovation for defen-
dant firms is not counterbalanced by significant transfers from NPEs
to other inventors or innovators.132  Hence, patent assertion by NPEs
constitutes a tax on innovation.
Schwartz and Kesan assert, to the contrary, that most of what de-
fendants pay is merely a transfer to “meritorious” patent owners.133
They note that defendants’ payments to outside counsel are less than
one-quarter of the total direct cost.134  But that is not quite right: they
forget that NPEs also spend on legal fees and other operating costs.
As we see from Table 5, for publicly traded NPEs, about 70% of the
payments that defendants make go to the legal costs of both parties or
to the operating costs of the NPEs.135  We see no evidence that private
NPEs are any more efficient at transferring wealth to worthy inventors.
Schwartz and Kesan counter that the data in Table 5 are unrepre-
sentative because they come from a small number of NPE firms and
because that sample includes three firms that conduct substantial
R&D in-house (Interdigital, Tessera and Rambus).136  The NPEs in
that sample account for about one-sixth of all of the lawsuit defenses
in the total database, so while the sample is hardly a small one, it
might be unrepresentative.  However, there is no reason to conclude
that it necessarily is unrepresentative, and, in fact, several of the large,
private NPEs are also known to conduct their own R&D.137  Neverthe-
less, this table sharply contradicts the common rhetoric about the
benefits of NPEs: most of the money that defendants pay does not
represent a transfer to inventors; instead, it is largely consumed by
legal and operating costs.  If we exclude the three R&D-performing
firms, then 78% of the cost is consumed by these costs while 21%
flows to inventors.  The evidence, although limited, suggests that
NPEs are hardly a socially efficient way of funding inventors.
Schwartz and Kesan also fail to consider the dynamic effect on
innovation incentives caused by the costs arising from inadvertent in-
130 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 33. R
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 438–39. R
134 Id.
135 Depending on how one counts profits, only a couple percent flows to NPEs’ profits.
136 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 443–45. R
137 See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures Laboratory, INTELL. VENTURES, http://www.intellectual
ventures.com/index.php/inventions-patents/iv-lab (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (“Intellec-
tual Ventures Laboratory’s mission is to conduct advanced research on some of IV’s most
promising inventions.”)
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fringement.  They fundamentally misapprehend the patent-policy
framework we developed in Patent Failure and apply in this Essay.  In
Patent Failure, we measured the aggregate benefits that large American
firms derived from their patents and the costs they incurred because
of the assertions of other parties’ patents.138  We studied the period
from 1984 to 1999, a time before NPE litigation was significant, and
we found that for most technologies and most industries, the U.S. pat-
ent system imposed a net tax on innovation.139  We attribute this fail-
ure to the deterioration of the notice function of the patent system.140
Especially for business methods and software, the patent system pro-
vides innovators who might be targeted with a patent suit with little
information about the existence, ownership, or scope of relevant pat-
ent rights.141  The patent tax that we identified in our book arises be-
cause of legal costs, various indirect business costs, and transfers in the
form of license and damages payments.  Innovation is equally discour-
aged by the payment of legal costs and the payment of transfers.
What Schwartz and Kesan are really expressing is simply their
hope that the license payments gained by NPEs provide a positive in-
centive for invention and innovation, and that this incentive more
than offsets the harm done to defendants.  But we already know that
the aggregate value of patent-based incentives is smaller than the ag-
gregate value of negative incentives in the sectors affected by NPE liti-
gation.142  Furthermore, we cast serious doubt on their premise that
NPEs actually provide a significant incentive for invention or innova-
tion.  In Part V.C, we show that publicly traded NPEs transfer a small
fraction of the costs that they impose to inventors.
Schwartz and Kesan’s line of argument appeals to many commen-
tators who believe that NPEs provide a special benefit to small firms
and independent inventors by vindicating their patent rights.143  At
the outset, we are suspicious of this argument because the small inven-
tors who really get a significant return from their patents in the bi-
138 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 95–146. R
139 See id. at 138–46.
140 See id. at 147–64.
141 See id. at 187–214.  We build the case that most patent infringement is inadvertent.
For example, we show that patent defendants are hardly ever shown to be copyists. Id. at
126; see also Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1451 (2009) (finding that out of a data set of 1871 patent infringement opin-
ions, 129 of them included allegations of copying, and that of these 129 opinions, copying
was found only in 33 cases).
142 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 145. R
143 See McDonough, supra note 14, at 223; Shrestha, supra note 14, at 118; cf. Myhrvold, R
supra note 22 (arguing that inadequate funding severely hinders innovation and that NPEs R
can help create a capital market to fund inventions). But see Feldman, supra note 85, at 53 R
(finding that 65% of surveyed “venture capitalists disagreed with the statement, ‘[a]s a
venture capitalist, in making funding decisions, I consider the potential for selling patents
to patent assertion entities if the companies fail.’  Only 18% agreed.”).
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otech and medical-device industries have flourished without relying
on NPE enforcement.144  We have trouble seeing how a trickle of NPE
payments to small firms in the tech sector makes much difference to
the overall rate of innovation.  We note that the majority of small
high-tech firms do not rely on patent protection to profit from their
R&D.145  We also note that only about one-half of the patents asserted
by NPEs come from small firms and independent inventors.146  And
this study shows that most of the firms sued by NPEs are, in fact, small
firms.  These findings suggest that NPEs do more to discourage inno-
vation among small firms than they do to encourage it.
C. Are There Good NPEs?
A third significant line of criticism is that our critical treatment of
NPE patent litigation lacks nuance.  Critics contend that certain NPEs
play socially valuable roles and that they get unfairly tarnished because
of the actions of other problematic NPEs.147  Peter Detkin from Intel-
lectual Ventures commented on our work.  The following is an ex-
cerpt from Gametime IP’s report of its interview with Detkin:
 “They are taking a small piece of the puzzle and extrapolating out
to the entire puzzle,” explains Detkin.  He believes that the basic
premise behind the research is a real phenomenon—that there are
bad actors who impose costs onto everyone because of the improper
way in which they use the legal system.  “When I coined the term
‘troll’ more than 10 years ago, I was talking about people who take
specious patents that were likely invalid and asserted them broadly
across an industry to extract nuisance value settlements.”  Ten years
later, Detkin thinks some of the research validates his suspicions
that a lot of people are “gaming the system and that there is a con-
summate cost to society.”
. . . .
. . . “To me, when you win at trial and on appeal, that means that
your patents are not of ‘doubtful validity’ anymore.”  In fact, the
amount of the settlement alone speaks volumes about the strength
144 See Bessen et al., supra note 1, at 29 (finding that only 1% of NPE lawsuits arise in R
drug or medical-technology patent classes).
145 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1287, 1291–92 (2009);
Do Patents Really Matter to Startups?  New Data Reveals Shifting Habits, TECHCRUNCH (June 21,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/21/do-patents-really-matter-to-startups-new-data-
reveals-shifting-habits/; cf. James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, 18 B.U. J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 241, 255–57 (2012) (showing that most software firms do not patent and that the
increase of patenting in the software industry is due to a few large firms).
146 Colleen Chien, A Race to the Bottom, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Jan./Feb. 2012, at 10, 13
fig.2 (using RPX data to show that 50% of litigated patents are owned by small companies).
147 See McDonough, supra note 14, at 223; Shrestha, supra note 14, at 118; cf. Myhrvold, R
supra note 22 (defending the author’s own company as one that promotes investment in R
applied research).
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of NTP’s claims.  As former head of IP litigation for Intel, Detkin
agreed, saying “I would have to be hard pressed to go to my man-
agement and say ‘You should pay more than half a billion dollars
for patents we don’t think we infringe.’”148
We certainly acknowledge that some types of NPE behavior are
likely to be socially desirable.  Certain NPEs administer patent pools;
others facilitate technology transfer and the outsourcing of R&D.
However, we disagree with the view that only “nuisance value”149 trolls
are problematic.  NPEs that press their assertions on to trial have a
strikingly low win rate,150 and even those that find a measure of suc-
cess in court generally cause harm to innovation.
We disagree with Detkin and with Schwartz and Kesan that an
NPE like NTP is meritorious, and we lament the ability of NPEs to
extract large settlements or court awards from small, innovative firms
like RIM.  We believe that the NTP suit is a poster child for the prob-
lem of patent notice failure and harmful patent assertion by NPEs.
NTP was founded by a failed wireless e-mail innovator named Cam-
pana and his patent attorney.151  Campana obtained patents on wire-
less e-mail containing vague claims that were hidden from RIM during
the early years of research and development of the BlackBerry.152
RIM was unaware of Campana’s invention and did not become aware
of his patent until after they had succeeded with their innovation.153
Nevertheless, RIM was forced to share the fruits of its success with
NTP, a company that contributed nothing to the BlackBerry.154  Sup-
porters of NTP might consider them “meritorious” because they
achieved litigation victories in court (although the asserted claims
were later invalidated during reexamination)155 and a large settle-
ment payment.  Our view is that NTP acted opportunistically to expro-
priate a portion of the rewards earned by a genuine innovator.
Schwartz and Kesan accuse us of focusing on the wrong question,
asserting that the real question is “whether the lawsuits are being
148 Anderson, supra note 80. R
149 Id.
150 See Allison et al., Repeat Patent Litigants, supra note 3, at 687 (finding that the win R
rate for the most litigated patents is 10.7% compared to 47.3% for once-litigated patents).
Win rates must be interpreted cautiously because cases that go to trial may differ from
cases that are settled.  One study that controls for selection bias estimates that 28% of NPE
patents would be found at least partially invalid for lack of novelty or for obviousness if they
were litigated through trial. See Miller, supra note 109, at 6–7. R
151 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 49–50. R
152 See id. at 49–50, 124–25.
153 See id. at 49.
154 See id.
155 Although NTP succeeded in court, the relevant patents were invalidated during
reexamination at the PTO—too late to benefit RIM.  The Federal Circuit affirmed the
invalidation of one of the NTP patents and partially reversed and remanded the findings of
invalidity for the other patents. See In re NTP, 654 F.3d 1279, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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brought because the defendants are infringers of a valid patent.”156
However, standard economic-welfare analysis implies that patent liti-
gation even over valid patents can be socially harmful.  If litigation
incurs tens of billions of dollars of socially wasteful expenditure each
year, then this represents a static loss in social welfare.  If litigation
also decreases innovation incentives, then the social losses could be
much larger.  Large numbers of expensive lawsuits by NPEs impose
substantial costs on society regardless of whether the patents involved
are valid or not.157
VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The rapid growth and high cost of NPE litigation documented
here should set off an alarm, warning policymakers that the patent
system still needs significant reform to make it a truly effective system
for promoting innovation.  The heterogeneous nature of NPEs—rang-
ing from universities to semiconductor-design firms to trolls—suggests
that policy reform should address troll-like behavior rather than
merely status as an NPE.158
The top priority is reform of the patent system to improve notice;
this kind of reform will make the patent system perform more like an
idealized property system.159  More rigorous enforcement of the
claim-definiteness standard would be an excellent step forward.  Like-
wise, we favor rigorous implementation of recent Supreme Court deci-
156 Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at 455. R
157 Schwartz and Kesan appear to misunderstand that we applied the label of “dead-
weight loss to society” to socially unnecessary expenditures related to litigation and asser-
tion. See also Bessen & Meurer, supra note 30, at 61 & n.11 (describing “deadweight R
losses”).  They assert, incorrectly, “Bessen and Meurer’s calculation assumes every time a
small inventor licenses a patent to a practicing company, it results in a ‘deadweight loss,’
regardless of the merits of the infringement claim.”  Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 44, at R
440–41.  That is not so.  First, ex ante licensing typically does not involve much transaction
costs by comparison to the kind of ex post licensing that NPEs do.  We only measure the
activity of NPEs and only count social losses to the legal and operating costs, not to actual
transfers to inventors or NPE investors.
158 See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1587 (2011) (distinguishing between “patentees who
make real contributions to innovation and those who do not”); Damien Geradin, Anne
Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls?  The Role of Non-Practicing Patent Owners in the
Innovation Economy 3 (Tilburg Univ., TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-018, 2008) (arguing
that “the definition of all [NPEs] as patent trolls is far too broad and is unjustified by
economic theory and evidence”).
159 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 215–26; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, R
at 74; Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 5–6 (2013).  Lemley and Melamed also emphasize that patent reformers should
focus on fundamental patent reforms that reduce the harm from patents asserted by both
practicing and non-practicing entities. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 4 (manuscript at R
4–5).
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sions restricting the patentability of business methods and other
abstract processes that are difficult to propertize.  It is also crucial to
provide greater transparency in the patent system.  Robin Feldman
and Tom Ewing document the remarkable opaqueness of Intellectual
Ventures in connection with its patent ownership and patent asser-
tion.160  Finally, courts should rigorously supervise patent-lawsuit dam-
ages awards to make sure that damages are proportionate to the value
of the patented technology.161  These reforms should not harm genu-
ine inventors who crave publicity rather than secrecy and who should
still be able to obtain broad but clear patent protection.
It is also instructive to look for policy reforms in the law and eco-
nomics analysis of the generic problem of frivolous lawsuits.  One
promising policy reform is greater use of fee shifting to favor defend-
ants in cases brought by trolls.  Allison et al. find that troll patents fare
poorly in court.162  The bargaining power of a troll seeking a nuisance
settlement would be greatly diminished in an aggressive fee-shifting
regime.  Similarly, more stringent pleading requirements have been
justified in other areas of the law as a method of reducing frivolous
lawsuits; this strategy might also work for patent litigation.163
CONCLUSION
Using survey data and the associated database of NPE litigation,
our major findings are these:
The direct costs of NPE patent assertions are substantial, totaling
about $29 billion accrued in 2011.  This figure does not include indi-
rect costs to the defendants’ businesses such as diversion of resources,
delays in new products, and loss of market share.  Even so, the direct
costs are large relative to total business spending on R&D, which to-
taled $247 billion in 2009,164 implying that NPE patent assertions ef-
fectively impose a significant tax on investment in innovation.
Much of this burden falls on small and medium-sized companies,
which make up about 59% of the companies sued and pay about 37%
of the direct costs.  NPE litigation costs smaller companies more rela-
tive to their revenues.  In addition, smaller companies pay relatively
more to NPEs in connection with assertions that do not go to court.
160 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
3–5 (2012), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf.
161 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 2044 (2007).
162 Allison et al., Repeat Patent Litigants, supra note 3, at 680. R
163 See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Require-
ments in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935 (1990) (discussing the stringent
pleading requirements in the civil rights context).
164 See NAT’L SCI. BD., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012,
at 4-4 (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/c04.pdf.
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The burden of all of these costs appears to rebut the assertions that
NPEs play an important role in improving the profits of innovative
start-ups.
About a third of the cost to defendants involves patent assertions
that do not go to court.  Moreover, we have likely underestimated
these costs because we have not surveyed small companies that do not
also have NPE patent litigation.
NPEs appear to be highly heterogeneous.  Much of the litigation
appears to consist of nuisance suits that settle for a few hundred thou-
sand dollars.  But some NPEs are “big-game hunters” who seek and get
settlements in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.
Little of the out-of-pocket payments made by defendants ends up
in the pockets of small inventors.  Only about 5% goes to independent
inventors and roughly half of that goes to large firms.  If one adds the
R&D spending of some of the NPE companies, that share rises to
20%.  Nevertheless, most of the out-of-pocket costs—roughly 70%—
go to socially wasteful legal fees or to the NPEs’ operating expenses.
These findings imply that the recent surge in NPE litigation is a
significant social problem associated with billions of dollars of socially
wasteful expenditure each year, as well as reduced innovation incen-
tives for both small and large firms.  Moreover, while NPEs appear to
assert a high percentage of patents that would be found invalid if chal-
lenged in court, even valid patents impose social costs when litigated.
More generally, our analysis suggests that a major cause of the high
rates of litigation may be poor patent notice, which may create high
levels of inadvertent infringement.  In this sense, NPE litigation may
be more a symptom of a deeper problem than the result of a particu-
lar business model.
We join our critics in the call for more research on the costs and
potential benefits of NPEs.  But we also note that legal scholars have
now accumulated quite a bit of empirical evidence.  In particular, over
the last several years we have made three different estimates of the
costs that NPEs impose on defendants, each using a different data
source and a different methodology and estimating a slightly different
measure.165  Together, all three provide a reasonably consistent pic-
ture: these costs are substantial, and the available evidence further
suggests that defendants’ private costs correspond to substantial social
costs as well.  This picture might not correspond to preconceived no-
tions about NPEs or to the personal perceptions of individual patent
attorneys, but until better evidence comes along, this evidence pro-
vides an important guide for policy.
165 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34; Bessen et al., supra note 1; Bessen & Meurer, R
supra note 30. R
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1. LOG COST REGRESSED AGAINST LOG COMPANY REVENUE
(1) (2)
Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients Standard Error
Intercept 10.30 (0.85) 10.90 (0.91)
Ln(Rev) 0.13 (0.04) 0.10 (0.04)
Revenue < $100m -1.11 (0.63)
Note: 784 observations.
